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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the changes to airline networks, service patterns and competition that have 
taken place as a result of recent airline mergers on both sides of the North Atlantic as well as 
through trans-atlantic alliances. 
Capacity, frequency and the competitive position are studied at London and New York 
with the use of schedule data within different markets where measures of market concentration 
are evaluated. ICAO data is employed to examine load factors on international routes and UK 
CAA data to consider the distribution of traffic between airports in London.
 It is shown that the effectiveness of the hubs has increased, with enhanced efficiency for 
surviving airlines, through fewer competitors, an enlarged network and greater control of 
capacity. Potential concerns are identified however, regarding passenger choice, pricing and 
service options that suggest the industry is moving towards an oligopoly. Smaller cities are also 
seen to be the losers from consolidation with slot divestments favouring increased service in the 
dense markets, with many regional links being axed altogether. 
The paper supplements the literature on airline consolidation with a particular focus on 
the two biggest markets in the world - London and New York - which demonstrate some similar 
but also some different issues. Both airline network impacts and choice and service for local 
consumers are considered. 
Keywords: Mergers, Alliances, Competition, Concentration, Networks, Slots
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INTRODUCTION
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness……
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, 1859 
The airline industry has seen major consolidation over the last decade, particularly in Europe and 
North America. In Europe, mergers have taken place between British Airways, Iberia, bmi 
British Midland and Aer Lingus to form International Airlines Group (IAG) (1) while Lufthansa 
has acquired Swiss, Austrian and more recently Brussels Airlines. In the United States, Delta and 
Northwest set off the current round of consolidation in 2008 followed by United-Continental, 
Southwest-Air Tran, American-US Airways and most recently Alaska-Virgin America.
On the North Atlantic, the market has become concentrated around four joint ventures 
where there were once many competing rival airlines. These mirror the three global alliance 
groups plus Delta with Virgin Atlantic which provides another alternative for traffic to and from 
the UK (2).
It was therefore considered interesting to assess the impact of these changes on air service 
provision at London and New York. These are still the two biggest air travel markets in the 
world and are served by a wide range of carriers through a number of different airports. London 
has six airports designated by IATA: Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton, London City and 
Southend. New York has five: JFK, Newark, La Guardia, Westchester County and Newburgh-
Stewart. Unlike dominated hubs such as Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Atlanta or Dallas Fort Worth 
where there has been little change as a result of the industry restructuring, London and New 
York offer the opportunity to review the impact on a broader and more diverse market. Another 
development at New York was the slot swap between Delta and US Airways in 2012 (3) which 
gave Delta an increased presence at JFK and La Guardia (in exchange for US Airways 
strengthening its position at Washington DC Reagan). 
The time period from 2005 to 2015 was chosen for study. 2005 provides a good 
representation of the position after the industry had recovered from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 
2001 but before the economic crisis and the 'credit crunch' hit in 2007 .With the exception of Air 
France/KLM, the major merger activity also took place after this point. 2015 was selected 
because complete data was not yet available for 2016 from most sources at the time the research 
was undertaken. It also post-dated most of the recent industry consolidation.
Several different sources have been used to analyse the developments. Innovata schedule 
data, which provides capacity and frequency information by route and airline, has been collected 
for the second week in July 2005 and July 2015 at the London and New York airports. This is 
considered representative of the peak season schedule without holiday period adjustments. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) data has been obtained for the years 2005 and 
2015 to study changes in the international traffic and capacity utilisation by route and airline. UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) traffic data has also been used to study the London airport 
market share by route.
There are always risks with the representativeness of comparative static analysis but it is 
felt that the findings vindicate the methods used as they appear intuitively correct and don’t 
suggest the existence of different trends in intervening years or the need to investigate alternative 
principal causal factors besides mergers and consolidation. 
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MARKET CONCENTRATION
The first stage of the analysis aims to investigate the impact of airline mergers and transatlantic 
alliances on market concentration in London and New York. The Innovata data for July 2005 and 
July 2015 showed operations and seats per week by airline and alliance by route. This was turned 
into percentages to enable indices of market concentration to be calculated on both bases. Using 
the  Herfindahl - Hirschman Index (HHI) to investigate the share by airline involved the 
aggregation of the percentages for each route for the airline examined. It should be noted that 
this involved the identification of airlines operating as franchisees for another such as GB 
Airways and British Mediterranean for British Airways or subsidiaries such as Envoy Air owned 
by American Airlines.
It is a standard  and well–established means of measuring the acceptability of mergers 
and alliances and of their impact on market share and competition (4),(5). The calculation would 
show that an industry or sector totally dominated by one firm would score 10,000. The index is 
given by,
HHI = S12 + S22 + S32 + S42 + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sn2
where Si2 is the market share of individual firms i (airlines here) and has been used by the UK 
Office of Fair Trading, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Federal Trade 
Commission. Values of HHI of less than 1000 are said to represent an unconcentrated and very 
competitive market whereas market values greater than 1800 represent concentration and a 
relative absence of competition. If mergers and alliances were to raise the HHI above 1800 then 
the merger would be challenged however when the statistic is already above 1800, any proposed 
merger should not result in an increase of more than 100. Alternative guides suggest these 
absolute numbers can change, for example, the US DOJ uses 2500 as an indication of a 
concentrated market. 
Table 1 shows the HHI results on the basis of frequency, measured as operations per 
week, for the London area airports and the New York area airports for 2005 and 2015.  Table 2 
shows the results for the same airports on the basis of capacity, measured as seats per week. The 
airports for London are London City (LCY), London Gatwick (LGW), London Heathrow (LHR), 
London Luton (LTN) and London Stansted (STN). For New York, they are New York Newark 
(EWR), New York John F Kennedy (JFK) and New York La Guardia (LGA). 
The comparison of these airports for each year is interesting showing that in 2005 
measured in frequency, LCY and JFK were similar with relatively low values whereas LTN and 
EWR were similar with higher values.  Looking at capacity, EWR was similar to both LTN and 
STN and JFK had the lowest concentration measured by both capacity and frequency. In 2015, 
JFK remains the lowest in frequency and capacity terms and STN and EWR still have similar 
high scores with STN the highest.
However, the instructive comparison is between the years.  This shows that all airports 
had more concentrated traffic in 2015 with the exception of LTN. This is less concentrated as 
Ryanair and Wizz Air have more frequency and capacity than in 2005 when easyJet dominated. 
The figures for JFK show that this concentration is least pronounced for the HHI measure of 
capacity.
Consequently, it can be seen that the effectiveness of hubs has increased as the traffic has 
concentrated in fewer airlines and competition has declined. At congested airports, such as LHR, 
LGW and LGA, airlines may well reduce links to smaller markets as well as changing aircraft 
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gauge to maintain key international slots and in turn, this may impact services from other airports 
in the system but there are still implications for consumer welfare (6).  
Tables 3 and 4 show the HHI calculations when in both 2005 and 2015, Air France and 
KLM are grouped together. In 2015, the other major groupings are of American Airlines and US 
Airways who merged in late 2013 but operated as separate subsidiaries until late in 2015 and the 
airlines in the IAG group, British Airways, Iberia and Vueling.  Aer Lingus did not join IAG 
until after July 2015. In addition, there is the Lufthansa group that includes German Wings, 
Austrian and Swiss. Obviously, not all airports are affected and so their calculations are the same 
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. It is expected that these calculations will indicate increased levels of 
concentration by comparison to Tables 1 and 2 and that is largely the case. 
In every case where the groupings have been taken into account except for London City, 
concentration is seen to be proportionately greater in 2015 than in 2005 by comparison to the 
airline analysis between the years. It is conclusive that the HHI has shown a greater inclination 
towards oligopoly as time has moved on. For London City in 2005, the operation of KLM and 
CityJet, then owned by Air France, is not mirrored in 2015 as CityJet was sold in 2014, so the 
increased concentration over the decade, although marked, is not as large as the airline analysis 
shown in Tables 1 and 2 where groupings are not taken into account.  It is noteworthy that for 
New York JFK, the HHI scores are mostly below 1800.
It may also be interesting to examine alliance traffic across the North Atlantic where the 
anti-trust immunity has had profound impacts (7). Consequently, for the traffic from London, 
destinations were restricted to Canada and the USA. In the other direction, destinations in Europe 
were selected along with Moscow. These results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. In London 
airports, in both years, oneworld is the chief player with over 60 percent of the share. However, 
in New York, in 2005, SkyTeam had over 50 percent whereas Star Alliance is the largest alliance 
in 2015. New York is less concentrated and the HHI calculations indicate that. The switch of 
Continental from SkyTeam to Star has led to three more evenly matched Alliance groups in New 
York in 2015 which has reduced concentration in New York whereas it increased in London over 
the same period.   Of course, a wider or different focus on transatlantic markets beyond London 
would yield somewhat different conclusions and some work by the authors, not reported here, 
shows this in terms of alliance domination. This could be the subject of further research.    
TRAFFIC AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENTS
To consider in more detail the impact of the major changes in industry structure and slot 
allocation, several case studies have been conducted for London and New York. Previous 
research has identified differences in airline merger outcomes between Europe and the US (8).
Impact on individual routes at London Heathrow of British Airways merger with bmi 
British Midland 
British Midland had built up a short-haul network at London Heathrow over many years, adding 
the ‘shuttle’ routes to Belfast, Edinburgh and Glasgow in 1982-84 to a few regional services it 
had long operated such as Birmingham, East Midlands, Leeds/Bradford and Teesside.  After that, 
expansion followed to the major European destinations such as Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and 
Dublin. Further European cities with a business travel focus were subsequently added including 
Frankfurt and Zurich. After Lufthansa acquired SAS’s interest in bmi however, direct 
competition with the LH group was dropped in favour of more distant cities dominated by other 
alliances such as Milan and Madrid. There were also a few leisure routes at relatively low 
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frequencies to Alicante, Naples, Nice, Palma and Venice plus a lone long-haul service to 
Mumbai. 
Thus in 2005 bmi served 21 destinations from Heathrow with a total of 535 weekly 
frequencies.  Of these 21 routes, BA competed from Heathrow on 11 of them (545 frequencies) 
and other carriers contested 7 (314 frequencies). On 8 routes, bmi was the sole operator. By 
2015, BA was serving 17 of these places from Heathrow with a total of 697 frequencies.
Table 7 considers only those routes that were duplicated by BA and bmi in 2005. Here 
the changes over the period 2005-15 are more pronounced. 
The key points are that BA has largely removed former bmi frequencies and capacity 
altogether on routes where the airlines competed – actually offering fewer flights and seats than 
BA alone did in 2005. The beneficiaries in terms of market share have been easyJet in particular 
and other LCCs based at alternative London airports. BA has taken over the former bmi services 
from Heathrow to Belfast City, Dublin, Hanover, Leeds Bradford, Palma and Venice. Inverness 
has been also subsequently reinstated. Former bmi slots have been used by BA for more 
profitable opportunities elsewhere such as the long-haul market.
Other carriers on these routes (e.g. Air France, Alitalia, Virgin Atlantic) have increased 
frequency slightly but reduced aircraft size, also giving fewer seats in total. The main factor 
behind the increase in the other carriers’ frequency is the 63 weekly slots that BA had to give up 
to a new entrant willing to serve Aberdeen and Edinburgh from Heathrow. These were used by 
Virgin Atlantic’s Little Red in 2015 and now by flybe. This has still failed to generate more 
competition at Heathrow overall however. Virgin Atlantic has indeed been one of the main losers 
from bmi’s demise as it received around a quarter of its transatlantic traffic from a code-share 
arrangement (9).
Table 8 analyses the load factors for the calendar years 2005 and 2015 using ICAO data. 
These are only available for international routes so only seven of the 11 routes in Table 7 are 
covered. It shows BA load factor on these routes has improved dramatically but the other carriers 
have done even better. In 2005 load factors were on the low side, suggesting bmi was generating 
excess capacity and competition - bmi itself only managed a 62% load factor. In 2015 load 
factors are much more in line with global averages (short-haul is generally lower than long haul 
for most airlines). The ‘Other IAG’ category is essentially Iberia, which seems to be running 
excess capacity in 2015; the ICAO figures do not allow London Heathrow and London Gatwick 
to be separated out, it is likely that Heathrow alone would have shown a stronger performance in 
2015.
Table 9 examines the split of traffic between London airports in 2005 and 2015 on the 
routes formerly served by both BA and bmi from Heathrow. The total traffic on these routes is 
hardly changed over 10 years but Heathrow (and Luton) have lost ground with all the others 
gaining market share. This shows that changing airline strategies have reduced the role of 
Heathrow on short haul routes. We are perhaps seeing a segmentation of business passengers to 
London City, connecting passengers to Heathrow and leisure passengers to the other airports. 
The implication of the various data above is that BA has prioritised yields over volume - 
and probably also connecting passengers over local traffic - after bmi was absorbed, on the 
combined network. Many previous Heathrow customers (presumably the lower yield point to 
point ones) are now having to use other London airports. Other research has shown that nearby 
airport pairs are imperfect substitutes of each other (10) and frequency choices of network 
airlines are not affected by competition from low-cost airlines operating in nearby secondary 
airports (11).
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Impact on Individual Routes at New York Newark of the Merger between Continental and 
United
The routes from Newark that were served by both Continental and United in 2005 have been 
compared with United’s service in 2015 (Table 10). There are only five such routes which are to 
other United hubs (Chicago O’Hare, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington 
Dulles).
In this case, the merger appears to have produced a positive outcome as total capacity has 
increased, total frequency has stayed the same and average aircraft size has got larger. Other 
airlines flying these routes have also increased seat capacity and aircraft size but with a slight 
decline in frequency. This is one of the ‘silver linings’ that can emerge from mergers in the 
longer term (12).
This is because these are the hub-hub routes for the enlarged United and hence critical to 
the new network. The other United routes from Newark in 2015 were only served by Continental 
originally and are now served by United instead so there is not much change on those. This 
conforms to other research suggesting connectivity has increased following the United-
Continental merger (13).
Impact on Individual Routes at New York La Guardia of the Slot Swap between US 
Airways and Delta
At New York La Guardia, a rather different situation can be seen which is more analogous to the 
London one. US Airways and Delta arranged a slot swap whereby DL gained US slots at La 
Guardia while US acquired DL slots at Washington National together with a cash payment (14). 
The transaction was viewed negatively by many stakeholders (15).
As in London, Delta was obliged to cede some slots as part of the package to introduce 
new competition. 
This has had a negative impact on travellers who were previously served by US Airways 
at La Guardia but are no longer part of the AA-US network. Table 11 shows that 10 routes have 
been dropped altogether. These typically each operated about three times per day to regional 
points in the northeast US using small aircraft (e.g. Albany, Ithaca, Providence). On the eight 
routes that were served by US Airways alone in 2005 but are now served only by Delta, 
frequencies and capacity have both been slashed although aircraft size has become larger. This 
suggests the consumer has seen a reduced level of service with the potential for higher fares and 
load factors for the airline. These are slightly larger cities than the first group such as Buffalo, 
Louisville, Rochester and Burlington VT. Some may be ‘rust belt’ locations with declining 
demand but others are clearly not. A further five destinations were served by both US Airways 
and Delta in 2005 (or Northwest with which Delta merged in 2008) but reduced to only Delta 
service by 2015. These have seen even more drastic cutbacks as the former US Airways capacity 
has been lost altogether and frequencies have more than halved. These are also significant 
centres: Charleston SC, Greenville/Spartanburg, Indianapolis, Manchester NH and Portland ME. 
Small and medium sized cities have been clearly identified as the big losers (16).
It is fair to say that there are other places which were served by both US and DL in 2005 
and are still served by US (or AA) and DL in 2015 so the competitive position on those markets 
has not changed greatly. Delta has launched new service to large cities that neither it nor US 
Airways served from La Guardia before. New carriers have taken advantage of the slot 
divestments (16 pairs) to launch service on the busier routes such as WestJet to Toronto 
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(somewhat ironically code-shared with Delta). Southwest and Virgin America also gained some 
slots following the AA-US merger (17). 
CONCLUSIONS
Airline market concentration has greatly increased over the time period 2005-15 at all airports in 
London and New York (except Luton where the growth of Wizz and Ryanair has diluted the 
previous dominance of easyJet) as shown by the HHI analysis. This is in-line with expectations. 
The two main hub airports, Heathrow and Newark have become heavily dominated by British 
Airways and United respectively. Gatwick is now the most important airport in easyJet’s system 
while Stansted has become a massive fortress for Ryanair. JFK is still a relatively dispersed 
market amongst airlines while La Guardia has become dominated by Delta. When the airline 
groupings are considered, this accentuates the concentration at all airports except London City 
where Air France/KLM has become a weaker player. The oneworld alliance is now 
overwhelmingly dominant at Heathrow and with the loss of bmi, other alliances are focusing on 
their alternative hubs in Europe. There is an overall tendency towards greater monopoly power 
with its consequences for pricing and consumer choice.
An analysis of operations, load factors and market shares shows that the change in 
Newark has been positive in terms of increases in frequency and seat capacity on the duplicated 
routes between United and Continental as these are between the hubs of the merged airlines. The 
hub network has also been maintained intact.
At Heathrow and La Guardia however there is more evidence of benefits to the airlines in 
reduced capacity and higher load factors on duplicated routes which may have negative 
implications for consumers. It is notable that small cities have been the big losers from these 
changes, seeing their slots raided to provide the divestments required by regulators. In contrast, 
more services are available on the dense routes and in the case of Heathrow to long-haul 
destinations. It is debatable as to whether the slot divestments have been an entirely positive 
experience for consumers. Arguably, this has created more competition and frequency where 
there was already plenty - once other airlines and airports are taken into account - but reduced 
capacity or lost service altogether on thinner monopoly markets which may have heavily 
depended on these links. It also may have reduced the ability to connect from these smaller cities 
to the wider domestic and international networks, something that is rarely considered in 
competition assessments which focus on competition between carriers on direct routes. Without 
the divestment requirements, the dominant airlines may have sustained more of these services to 
the smaller cities. In London, point to point passengers seeking competitive fares are 
increasingly being forced to alternative airports with resultant inconvenience in overall journey 
times, while British Airways and Heathrow concentrate on connecting and high yield traffic. 
These are significant findings.
In the Transatlantic market from London, concentration has increased partly through the 
BA-American grouping but also the tie up between Delta and Virgin Atlantic which has 
significantly reduced the number of independent competitors. At New York however this is less 
marked as the split between the alliances has become more even, at least as far as direct flights 
are concerned. An area which merits further research is whether the decline in competition from 
rival airlines offering indirect routings on a city pair where other carriers have direct service, has 
led to higher fares on the direct flights or elimination of discounts for connecting services where 
they are now competing against a direct flight of the same merged airline or alliance group. 
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An awareness of these findings can inform airline and airport reactions to the market, in 
particular, whether regional links should be reinstated and also whether greater or different 
regulatory intervention is needed. Returning to where this paper started with the quotation from 
Charles Dickens, mergers and consolidation have led to the best of times for many of the airlines 
involved in the London and New York markets but the worst of times for some of the 
passengers. Regulatory approval and amelioration measures which may have appeared wise at 
the time may yet come to be seen as foolish with the evolution of the markets and the benefit of 
hindsight.  
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TABLE 1 HHI Results, Operations/Week, London and New York, 2005, 2015
Airport 2005     % of ops 2015     % of ops
London
LCY 1699       6.6 2758       7.0
LGW 1979     22.6 2449     27.1
LHR 2030     47.2 2738     43.4
LTN 4595       7.0 2957       8.7
STN 3944     16.6 5875     13.8
New York
EWR 4922     36.2 5413     32.7
JFK 1704     29.0 1987     36.7
LGA 2062     34.8 2745     30.6
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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TABLE 2 HHI Results, Seats/Week, London and New York, 2005, 2015
Airport 2005     % of seats 2015     % of seats
London
LCY 1548       2.4 2774      3.2
LGW 1584     20.1 2180    26.5
LHR 1857     55.1 2289    48.4
LTN 4380       6.5 2833      8.3
STN 4472     15.9 6374    13.6
New York
EWR 4283     32.9 4813    29.7
JFK 1381     40.0 1386    46.8
LGA 1633     27.1 2258    23.5
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
DENNIS and PITFIELD         14
TABLE 3 HHI results, Operations/Week, Airline Groups, London and New York, 2005, 
2015 
Airport 2005     % of ops 2015     % of ops
London
LCY 1804       6.6 2758       7.0
LGW 1979     22.6 2503     27.1
LHR 2037     47.2 2919     43.4
LTN 4595       7.0 2957       8.7
STN 3944     16.6 5875     13.8
New York
EWR 4922     36.2 5434     32.7
JFK 1705     29.0 2025     36.7
LGA 2062     34.8 3125     30.6
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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TABLE 4 HHI Results, Seats/Week, Airline Groups, London and New York, 2005, 2015
Airport 2005     % of seats 2015     % of seats
London
LCY 1683       2.4 2774       3.2
LGW 1584     20.1 2226     26.5
LHR 1861     55.1 2421     48.4
LTN 4380       6.5 2833       8.3
STN 4472     15.9 6374     13.6
New York
EWR 4283     32.9 4837     29.7
JFK 1384     40.0 1425     46.8
LGA 1633     27.1 2604     23.5
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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All airports 4561 4665
New York
All airports 4159 3484
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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All airports 4728 5055
New York
All airports 4035 3470
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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TABLE 7 Change in Operations at London Heathrow on Routes Duplicated between 
British Airways (BA) and bmi (BD), 2005, 2015















BA 545 85300 157 541 84344 156
BD 343 48697 142 0 0 na
Other IAG 42 7560 180 56 10004 179
IAG Total 930 14557 152 597 94348 158
Others 224 39404 176 251 38969 155
Total 1154 180961 157 848 133317 157
BA – British Airways, BD – bmi British Midland, IAG – International Airlines Group
Routes from London: Aberdeen, Amsterdam, Brussels, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Madrid, 
Manchester, Milan Linate, Mumbai, Nice, Paris CDG
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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TABLE 8 Change in Load Factor at London on International Routes
Duplicated between British Airways (BA) and bmi (BD), 2005, 2015
2005   2015
% load factor   % load factor
BA 68.1   76.0
BD 62.2   na
Other IAG 77.1   68.7
IAG 67.3   74.9
Others 70.3   83.4
Total 68.0   77.5
BA Systemwide 76.3   81.5
IATA Scheduled 74.8   80.4
BA – British Airways, BD – bmi British Midland, IAG – International Airlines Group
Routes from London: Amsterdam, Brussels, Madrid, Milan Linate, Mumbai, Nice, Paris CDG
IATA – International Air Transport Association
Source: ICAO (BA figures include LGW and LHR but not LCY)
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TABLE 9 Change in Market Share of London Airports on Routes










London City 583416 2.9 1603178 7.8
Gatwick 3291794 16.3 4425408 21.6
Heathrow 12678597 62.9 10703996 52.3
Luton 2220175 11.0 1528828 7.5
Southend 0 0.0 214566 1.0
Stansted 1368812 6.8 1973703 9.7
Total 20142794 100.0 20449679 100.0
Routes from London: Aberdeen, Amsterdam, Brussels, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Madrid, 
Manchester, Milan Linate, Mumbai, Nice, Paris CDG 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority
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TABLE 10 Change in Operations at New York Newark on Routes Duplicated between 
















CO 209 25001 120 0 0 na
UA 158 17590 111 366 52739 144
CO+UA 367 42591 116 366 52739 144
Others 124 12890 104 109 13451 123
Total 491 55481 113 475 66190 139
CO – Continental, UA – United
Routes from New York: Chicago O’Hare, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington 
Dulles
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
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TABLE 11 Change in Operations at New York La Guardia on Routes No Longer Served 

















US routes lost 176 6628 38 0 0                 na
US->DL 269 11705 44 163 9840 60
US & DL/NW
->DL 253 12651 50 117 7544 64
AA -  American, DL – Delta, NW – Northwest, US – US Airways
Source: Analysis of Innovata schedules data for second week of July
